CRONE, Judge.
The Indiana Department of Workforce Development ("DWD") determined that T.B. was ineligible for unemployment benefits, and she appealed. A DWD administrative law judge ("ALJ") set a telephone hearing for her appeal, but T.B. failed to provide a phone number where she could be reached for the hearing, and the ALJ dismissed her appeal. T.B. requested reinstatement of her appeal, but the DWD director of unemployment insurance appeals denied her request, finding that she failed to show good cause for reinstatement. She appealed the denial of her request for reinstatement to the DWD Review Board ("Review Board"), but it affirmed the denial. T.B. now appeals the Review Board's decision. Concluding that the Review Board properly found that T.B. failed to show good cause, we affirm.
T.B.
The Notice of Hearing provided in relevant part,
Ex.4.
The Instruction Sheet read in relevant part:
Ex.5.
The Acknowledgement Sheet was labeled at the top as follows:
Ex. 6. The Acknowledgment Sheet included boxes for the claimant to check whether he or she would participate in the hearing, would not participate in the hearing, or wished to withdraw the appeal. Below the boxes, it read:
Id.
T.B. did not return the Acknowledgment Sheet. The November 1 docket entry for the ALJ provides, "No return slip in file prior to hearing for [claimant]/appellant. Per instruction searched file and no tele[phone] # found for cl/app as of 11:30." Ex. 8. For that reason, no hearing was held, and the ALJ dismissed T.B.'s appeal. T.B. received a notice of dismissal, informing her that she had failed to participate in the appeal hearing, and therefore her appeal was dismissed. The notice of dismissal informed T.B. that she could request reinstatement, and that such a request "must show good cause why the appeal should be reinstated." Ex. 10.
T.B. timely submitted her request for reinstatement, in which she wrote,
Ex. 11.
The director of unemployment insurance denied T.B.'s request for reinstatement, concluding as follows: "It is the responsibility of the appealing party to submit a contact number. The appealing party did not submit a contact number and that does not constitute good cause for reinstatement." Ex. 13.
T.B. timely appealed the denial of reinstatement to the Review Board, writing,
Appellee's App. at 1-2. The Review Board affirmed the denial of T.B.'s request for reinstatement.
This is an appeal from the Review Board's denial of T.B.'s request to reinstate her appeal of the denial of her claim for unemployment benefits. T.B.'s claim is governed by the Indiana Unemployment Compensation Act ("the Act"). The Act provides unemployment benefits to individuals who are "unemployed through no fault of their own." Ind. Code § 22-4-1-1. Under the Act, an individual is disqualified for unemployment benefits if he or she is discharged for "just cause." Ind. Code § 22-4-15-1(a).
The Act provides that any decision of the Review Board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(a). When the Review Board's decision is challenged as being contrary to law, our review is limited to a two-part inquiry into: "(1) the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of facts." McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314, 1317 (Ind.1998) (quoting Ind. Code § 22-4-17-12(f)). Applying this standard, we review "(1) determinations of specific or `basic' underlying facts, (2) conclusions or inferences from those facts, sometimes called `ultimate facts,' and (3) conclusions of law." Id. The Review Board's findings of basic fact are subject to a "substantial evidence" standard of review. Id. In conducting our analysis, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the Review Board's findings. Id. The Review Board's conclusions regarding ultimate facts involve an inference or deduction based on the findings of basic fact, and we typically review them to ensure that the Review Board's inference is "reasonable" or "reasonable in light of its findings." Id. at 1317-18 (citation and quotation marks omitted). We review the Review Board's conclusions of law using a de novo standard. Ind. State Univ. v. LaFief, 888 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind.2008).
We observe that T.B. appeals pro se, and we stress that we hold pro se litigants to the same standard as trained attorneys. T.R. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 950 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), aff'd on reh'g, 956 N.E.2d 741. Although T.B. is appealing from the denial of her request for reinstatement of her appeal, she fails to present any argument that the Review Board erred in denying her request. Instead, she argues that she was not discharged for just cause. However, that issue is not properly before us. By failing to address the denial of her request for reinstatement, T.B. has waived her appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) ("The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22."); Loomis v. Ameritech Corp., 764 N.E.2d 658, 668 (Ind. Ct.App.2002) (failure to present a cogent argument waives that issue for appellate review), trans. denied.
Waiver notwithstanding, an argument that the Review Board erred in denying her request for reinstatement would fail. A request for reinstatement will be granted or denied at the discretion of the director of unemployment insurance appeals, or the director's designee. 646 Ind. Admin. Code 5-10-6. The party requesting reinstatement "must show good cause for the appealing party's failure to appear for the hearing." Id.
The unemployment insurance appeals director concluded that T.B. "did not
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., concurs.
RILEY, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
RILEY, Judge, concurring in result.
While I agree with the majority's decision to affirm the Review Board's decision, I write separately to address the majority's refusal to identify the respective parties by their complete names. In support of its use of initials, the majority relies on a footnote included in the recent supreme court's opinion of J.M. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 975 N.E.2d 1283, n. 1 (Ind.2012). In its footnote, the court noted that this method of identification is a confidentiality requirement which "is expressly implemented as to judicial proceedings by Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(1)(b)(xviii)." However, as is well established "our supreme court does not decide important questions of law in footnotes." See, e.g., Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). As such, this footnote does not invalidate the thoughtful on-point analysis by Judge Baker in Moore v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 951 N.E.2d 301, 304-06 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) about the use of initials to identify the respective parties in cases involving the Review Board. In Moore, this court held that the amendment to Administrative Rule 9(G), which incorporates by reference I.C. § 22-4-19-6, does not prohibit the use of full names of parties in routine appeals from the Review Board. See Id. at 306. With this proviso in mind, I agree with the majority that Tori Balog failed to show good cause for reinstatement of her employment at Arg Resources, LLC.